Marine Insurance and the Substantive Admiralty Law \u3cem\u3eA Comment on the Wilburn Boat Company Case\u3c/em\u3e by MacChesney, Brunson
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 57 Issue 4 
1959 
Marine Insurance and the Substantive Admiralty Law A Comment 
on the Wilburn Boat Company Case 
Brunson MacChesney 
Northwestern University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Admiralty Commons, Contracts Commons, Insurance Law Commons, Jurisdiction 
Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Brunson MacChesney, Marine Insurance and the Substantive Admiralty Law A Comment on the Wilburn 
Boat Company Case, 57 MICH. L. REV. 555 (1959). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol57/iss4/8 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
MARINE INSURANCE AND THE SUBSTANTIVE 
ADMIRALTY LAW* 
A COMMENT ON THE WILBURN BOAT COMPANY CASE 
Brunson MacChesneyt 
0 N JANUARY I, 1954, an admiralty lawyer would have pre-dicted with confidence that the rule governing the breach 
of express warranties in a marine insurance contract was a part 
of the general admiralty law and, as such, binding in all courts, 
state and federal. Although there was no Supreme Court case 
expressly so stating, he would have based his belief on the as-
sumption that marine insurance was at the "heart" of admiralty 
law1 and on the decisions of federal courts of appeal2 on this 
precise issue. He would not have been concerned with the absence 
of congressional action and he would have been fortified by the 
trend of Supreme Court decisions3 relating to the rights of 
maritime workers in which the principle of federal supremacy 
of the substantive admiralty law had been forcefully reiterated. 
He probably would not have indulged in the historical reflection 
that this principle, first enunciated in the Jensen case,4 was of 
relatively recent origin and had had a checkered career.11 He might 
or might not have observed the possible relevance of recent Su-
preme Court adjudication with respect to state power over choice-
of-law rules6 and particularly state legislative power over insurance 
• At the invitation of the editors, Professor MacChesney undertook to write this 
article especially for the memorial issue as a tribute to Professor Durfee, his former 
teacher.-Ed. 
tProfessor of Law and Director of International Legal Studies, Northwestern Univer-
sity School of Law.-Ed. 
1 GILMORE AND BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, c. II (1957), hereinafter cited as 
GILMORE AND BLACK. The present writer is indebted to these learned writers for their 
excellent discussion of the Wilburn decision [348 U.S. 310 (1955)) and its possible im-
plications. 
2 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Houston Oil Transport Co., (5th Cir. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 121; Home 
Ins. Co. v. Ciconett, (6th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 892; and the Wilburn Boat Company case 
in the Fifth Circuit (1953) 201 F. (2d) 833. 
3 The most recent decision was Pope &: Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). 
4 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. 
Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918), was the first application. 
Ii See Caldarola v. Eckert, 332 U.S. 155 (1947). 
6 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric 
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
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contracts.1- State statutory regulation of the terms of other types 
of insurance policies would also have seemed irrelevant to his 
prediction. 
If the shadow of the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Cushing 
v. Maryland Casualty Company8 crossed his mind, he would 
probably have assumed that the Supreme Court would set it right, 
or that, at most, the decision would be confined to the inter-
relationship between direct action statutes and the Limited Lia-
bility Act.0 In any event, it is doubtful he would have suspected 
that it might be the precursor of authoritative holdings that 
would undermine the basis of his confident prediction. 
In the Cushing litigation, the plaintiffs, representatives of 
seamen drowned in a tugboat accident, brought a direct action 
under the Louisiana Direct Action Statute10 against the liability 
underwriters of the tugboat owner to recover for damages under 
the Jones Act.11 There was diversity jurisdiction. The district 
court12 dismissed the action as to the undenvriters by summary 
judgment because the Louisiana statute was held not applicable 
to marine insurance, and, if applicable, it was invalid as being in 
conflict with the Limitation of Liability Act in which Congress, 
acting under its admiralty powers, had occupied the field. It was 
also invalid because it impaired the characteristic features of 
the general maritime law. The damage claims, already filed in the 
limitation proceeding, must therefore be litigated in that forum. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit13 dis-
agreed. The Louisiana Direct Action Statute was held to be 
applicable. The court held further that the direct action con-
stituted only a cumulative remedy within state power under the 
saving clause,14 and was a permissible regulation of insurance 
under the McCarran Act.15 It was, therefore; not in conflict with 
the general admiralty law, nor with the purpose of protecting 
shipowners in the Limited Liability Act. 
7 Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943). Watson v. Employers Liabil-
ity Assurance Corp.; 348 U.S. 66 (1954), might have sharpened the analogy. 
s (5th Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 536. 
o 49 Stat. 1479 (1936), 46 U.S.C. (1952) §§183-189. 
10 La. Rev. Stat. (1950) §22-655. 
1141 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. (1952) §688. 
12 Cushing v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., (E.D. La. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 681. 
1s (5th Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 536. 
14 Cf. Red .Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924). 
15 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §1012. 
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The Supreme Court16 vacated this judgment and remanded 
to" the district court with directions to continue the case until 
completion of the liability proceeding. The Supreme Court was 
so divided that there was no opinion of the Court. Four of the 
justices joined in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, 11 which an-
nounced the judgment of the Court. The McCarran Act was 
held not to be relevant. Without passing on the question of 
whether the Louisiana statute conflicted with the general ad-
miralty law, the opinion held that it did conflict with the Limited 
Liability Act as defeating both the concursus of claims and the 
limitation of shipowner's liability. Justice Clark's concurring 
opinion18 was the basis for the disposition of the controversy. He 
found it unnecessary to invalidate the Louisiana statute. By post-
poning the damage actions until the limitation proceeding was 
terminated, the shipowner is protected. In this way, there is no 
interference with the limitation proceeding. He did not regard 
the concursus argument as so clear that a state statute should 
be invalidated at this stage. 
The dissenting views of the four other justices were expressed 
by Justice Black.19 They would have affirmed the judgment of 
the court of"appeals. In support of this conclusion, Justice Black's 
opinion defined the uniformity requirement in admiralty as re-
stricted to the "essential features of an exclusive admiralty juris-
diction." The opinion then cited the extent of previous permitted 
state power, and stated that neither Congress nor the Court had 
established uniform rules for the regulation of marine insurance 
to the exclusion of the states. The jurisdiction of the states over 
marine insurance policies was said to be cqncurrent. The opinion 
added:20 "No reason has been advanced why marine insurance, 
long the province of the states, so imperatively requires uniformity 
that we should now hold that Congress alone can regulate it." 
Therefore, enforcement of the Louisiana statute would not im-
pair uniformity but would provide additional relief not othenvise 
available in admiralty.21 The balance of the opinion was devoted 
16 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954). The case has not as yet 
been tried on the remand. Depositions are still being taken. 
17 Id. at 410. Justices Reed, Jackson, and Burton joined. 
18 Id. at 423. 
10 Id. at 427. The Chief Justice, Justice Douglas, and Justice Minton concurred. 
20 Id. at 430-431. 
21 See Red Cross Line case, note 15 supra, and Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941). 
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to an attempt to refute the majority's construction of the Limited 
Liability Act. The McCarran Act alone was said to be a sufficient 
basis for upholding the Louisiana statute. 
The attitude toward marine insurance as a subjec;t of uniform 
general admiralty rules in Justice Black's opinion not only length-
ened the shadow cast by the court of appeals but proved to be 
the precursor of the majority opinion in Wilburn Boat Co. v. 
Fireman's Fund Insurance Company,22 decided February 28, 
1955, a decision decisively upsetting the confident prediction of 
our admiralty lawyer. Justice Clark, who had stood alone in the 
Cushing decision, joined the Wilburn dissenters and thus created 
an effective majority for this viewpoint. The dissent in Cushing 
could be reconciled with the maritime-but-local doctrine. The 
Direct Action statute could be assimilated as an additional remedy 
within the saving clause. But the tenor of the opinion, with its 
emphasis on state power to regulate insurance in the public in-
terest, the denial of a need for uniformity in marine insurance, 
and the clear implication of state power in the absence of con-
gressional action, would prove to be the more significant aspect 
of the dissent. 
The central question in the Wilburn litigation became whether 
the consequences of breaches of express warranties in the 
marine insurance policy issued by the insurer on insured's small 
houseboat, the Wanderer, were to be determined by admiralty 
law or by state law. The three Wilburn brothers, merchants in 
Dennison, Texas, had purchased the Wanderer, then laid up at 
Greenville, Mississippi. The Wilburns purchased the boat for 
use on Lake Texoma, an artificial inland lake on the border 
of Texas and Oklahoma. Before moving the boat, the Wilburns 
sought, through their Texas insurance agent, who did not handle 
marine insurance, marine coverage for the interstate journey 
through five states to its destination, Lake Texoma, and its use 
there. A full marine risk policy containing a fire clause was issued 
by the Chicago office of the insurer, a California corporation, 
through the Cleaveland Agency, of Rock Island, Illinois, acting 
for the insurer. 
The boat was destroyed by fire of unknown origin on Febru-
ary 25, 1949, as she lay afloat moored 300 yards from the Okla-
homa shore of Lake Texoma. The policy provided that the in-
22 348 U.S. 310 (1955). 
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surance should be void if the vessel was sold, assigned, trans-
ferred, or pledged without the previous written consent of the 
insurers.23 The policy also contained a warranty by the insured 
that the vessel would be used solely for private pleasure purposes 
and would not be hired or chartered unless the insured granted 
permission by indorsement on the policy.24 
The insured filed proof of loss. The insurer refused payment 
because of claimed breaches of these conditions. Insured filed 
suit in a Texas court, but the cause was removed because of 
diversity. The parties stipulated that the Wilburns had "sold" 
the boat to the Wilburn Boat Company, an Oklahoma corpora-
tion which they wholly owned; that the boat was chartered and 
used for hire, and that the vessel was mortgaged. The insurer 
defended on the basis of these breaches of the warranties. The 
insured claimed that the policy was a Texas contract by virtue 
of a Texas statute25 and that other Texas statutes invalidated 
an encumbrance clause26 and made the breach of the pleasure 
warranty no defense unless it was shown that the breach con-
tributed to the loss.27 They also asserted that the transfer to the 
Oklahoma corporation was not a breach and that the insured had 
waived or was estopped from claiming breach of the pleasure 
warranty. 
23 "It Is Also Agreed that this insurance shall be void in case this Policy or the 
interest insured thereby shall be sold, assigned, transferred or pledged without the 
previous consent in writing of the Assurers." 
24 "Warranted by the Assured that the within named vessel shall be used solely for 
private pleasure purposes during the currency of this Policy and shall not be hired or 
chartered unless permission is granted by endorsement hereon." 
25 Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1952) art. 21.42 provides: "Any contract of insurance 
payable to any citizen or inhabitant of this State by any insurance company or corpora-
tion doing business within this State shall be held to be a contract made and entered 
into under and by virtue of the laws of this State relating to insurance, and governed 
thereby, notwithstanding such policy or contract of insurance may provide that the con-
tract was executed and the premiums and policy (in case it becomes a demand) should 
be payable without this State, or at the home office of the company or corporation issuing 
the same." 
26 Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1952) art. 5.37: "Any provision in any policy of insurance 
issued by any company subject to the provisions of this law to the effect that if said 
property is encumbered by a lien of any character or shall after the issuance of such 
policy become encumbered by a lien of any character then such encumbrance shall render 
such policy void, shall be of no force and effect. Any such provision within or placed 
upon any such policy shall be null and void." 
27 Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1952) art. 6.14: "No breach or violation by the insured 
of any warranty, condition or provision of any fire insurance policy, contract of insurance, 
or application therefor, upon personal property, shall render void the policy or contract, 
or constitute a defense to a suit for loss thereon, unless such breach or violation con-
tributed to bring about the destruction of the property." 
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The case was tried before the court without a jury. The 
district court, in a brief opinion in the form of a letter to coun-
sel, 28 dismissed the action. He first held it was a maritime con-
tract covering a vessel on navigable waters in and outside of 
Texas and that Lake Texoma was navigable. He fur~her held 
that, being a maritime contract, it was governed by the general 
admiralty law and not by the law of Texas, and, under that 
general law, breaches of the warranties voided the policy by 
virtue of the literal performance29 rule. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,30 in affirming 
the judgment, agreed entirely with the district court. It found the 
maritime law controlling even though the action commenced in 
a state court. It held that, under that general maritime law, war-
ranties must be enforced as written. Construing insured's argu-
ment to be not that maritime law did not control, but that the 
Texas statutes modified it, the court acknowledged a conflict and 
found the state law invalid as hostile to the characteristic features 
of the substantive maritime law, citing its own decision in the 
Cushing case. The court further rejected the arguments that the 
statutes were regulatory in nature and that they were validated 
by the McCarran Act. 
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed.31 In an 
opinion by Justice Black, the Court held that there was no gen-
eral admiralty rule covering the case, and that the Court would 
not "fashion" one. The case was remanded for trial under the 
"appropriate" state law.32 The Court majority included Chief 
Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Clark, and Minton. Justice 
Frankfurter concurred33 in the result as justified by the local 
character of the controversy but argued in his separate con-
28 Unreported. The opinion may be found at pages 19-20 of the Transcript of 
Record in the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1954, No. 7, Wilburn 
Boat Company, Petitioners, vs. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company. 
29 See 2 ARNOULD oN MARINE INSURANCE, 14th ed. by Lord Chorley, c. 20 (1954), for 
a discussion of the development of this rule and its application in England. See, also, 
Vance, "The History of the Development of the Warranty in Insurance Law," 20 YALE 
L. J. 523 (1911). 
30 201 F. (2d) 833 (1953). 
31348 U.S. 310 (1955). 
32 Id. at 321, and footnote 6, p. 313, which reads, in part, as follows: "The Court 
of Appeals assumed that if any state law applied ,it was that of Texas. The question 
of the appropriate state law is not before us, however, and we express no opinion on that 
aspect of the case. Cf. Watson v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 ••• .'' 
33 348 U.S. 310 at 321 (1955). 
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currence that the opinion of the Court was unnecessarily broad 
and should not be applicable in a case presenting the need for 
uniformity in the general maritime law of insurance. 
Justice Reed, joined by Justice Burton, dissented.34 Justice 
Reed, while indicating a willingness to reconsider the literal per-
formance rule, would have, in the absence of such reconsideration, 
applied the settled literal performance rule as part of the general 
admiralty law in existence before the adoption of the Constitu-
tion and followed by the lower federal courts since that time. 
Interference by state law with respect to breaches of warranties 
in marine insurance contracts is an a fortiori interference with 
the necessary uniformity of maritime law in its interstate and 
international relations. Such state interference has been declared 
invalid in countless other cases and should be forbidden here. 
The majority opinion conceded that the policy in issue was a 
maritime contract within federal jurisdiction under the Admiralty 
clause of the Constitution. But, while the lower courts had as-
sumed that the substantive admiralty law governed, the Court 
denied that the terms of such a contract could be governed only 
by some federal admiralty rule. Remarking that much regulatory 
power had been left to the states, and particularly with respect 
to insurance companies and their contracts, the Court noted 
Congress had not acted and acknowledged that much of the 
controlling general admiralty law had been fashioned by itself, 
and that such rules were as supreme as an Act of Congress. 
The Court then defined the issues in the case to be (1) whether 
there was an existing judicially established admiralty rule govern-
ing these warranties, and (2) if not, should the Court "fashion" 
one? 
In examining the question of whether there was a judicially 
established federal admiralty rule, it disposed of its decision in the 
Coos County case,35 the only Supreme Court decision so cited by 
the Fifth Circuit, on the ground that marine insurance was not 
involved and no marine insurance rule was relied on. The de-
cision was explained as part of the "general commercial law" ap-
plicable in diversity cases to all insurance warranties prior to 
the Erie36 decision, and that the literal performance rule has not 
34 Id. at 324. 
35 Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U.S. 452 (1894). 
36 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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been regarded as one peculiar to the admiralty except in two 
circuits.37 Other circuits applying the rule were said to be follow-
ing state law38 or applying the "general commercial law"39 of the 
Swift v. Tyson40 era. An early dictum in a Supreme Court marine 
insurance case41 was not made with reference to a federal admiralty 
rule. Consequently, it concluded that no literal performance rule 
had been judicially established, and, therefore, state law must 
govern unless the Court now established a controlling rule. 
Proceeding, then, to the second issue, the Court reviewed 
the history of insurance regulation and its own precedents42 
concerning federal-state power in this area. It treated this history 
and these precedents as establishing primary, if not exclusive, 
state power over insurance, and, specifically, marine insurance as 
much as any other kind of insurance, at least until its decision in 
the South-Eastern Underwriters case43 in 1944. The McCarran 
Act,44 and previous congressional consideration of the problem, 
was said to show congressional intention to leave insurance regu-
lation to the states. No distinction was drawn between regulation 
and the substantive rules governing marine insurance contracts. 
Both were assumed to be subject to state law in the absence of 
action by Congress or the Court. 
This history was also alleged to demonstrate the greater diffi-
culties of judicial as distinguished from congressional resolution of 
the problem. While Congress could pass a comprehensive code, the 
judicial method would result in marine insurance being largely 
unregulated for many years. To formulate an admiralty rule in the 
instant case would be difficult. The "harsh"45 literal performance 
rule could be adopted, but most states have abandoned it wholly 
or partially. Some state statutes prohibit forfeiture in the absence 
37 Note 2 supra. 
38 348 U.S. 310 at 315, cases cited in footnote 12. 
39 Ibid., cases cited in footnote 13. 
40 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 1 (1842). 
41 Hazard's Administrator v. New England Marine Ins. Co., 8 Pet. (33 U.S.) 557 at 
580 (1834). . 
42 Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895), and Nutting v. Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 
553 (1902), were cited as relevant precedents. These two cases involved prosecutions of 
brokers for obtaining marine insurance from foreign insurance companies that were 
not licensed in accordance with state statutes governing admission of such companies. 
T,hey did not involve substantive regulation. 
43 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
44 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §1012. 
45 348 U.S. 310 at 320. 
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of bad faith or fraud, and others, such as Texas, believing this 
inadequate, require the breach to contribute to the loss insured 
against. The choice of the best rule is a policy question for 
Congress. Therefore, the Court, citing its previous refusal to 
"fashion" a rule in Halcyon v. Haenn,46 refused to undertake 
the task. After referring to the growth of the insurance business 
under state regulation and the reluctance of Congress to act even 
in marine insurance, where its power to so act is conceded, the 
Court "leave[s] the regulation of marine insurance where it has 
been-with the States."47 Which state's "regulation" was to apply 
in the instant controversy was left for determination in the new 
trial to be held after remand. 48 
What will be the consequences of this apparently far-reaching 
decision? Since Congress has legislated with respect to only a few 
matters49 in the marine insurance field, will there be any other 
part of marine insurance governed by the general admiralty law? 
Would the Court find any aspects of marine insurance in which a 
judicially created rule can be said to be controlling? If not, will 
the decision be confined to marine insurance? Or is it applicable 
to all questions of admiralty law on which Congress has not acted 
or for which no judicially fashioned rule can be ascertained? In 
his petition for rehearing, counsel for the insurance company 
wrote that losing a judgment was one thing, to lose the "law" 
was another.M Has the principle of federal supremacy of the sub-
stantive admiralty law been seriously undermined? 
The opinion of the Court made no effort to reconcile its 
decision with the Court's own recent holdings51 on federal suprem-
46 Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship C. &: R. Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952). 
47 348 U.S. 310 at 321. 
48 Ibid. After the remand, the case was retried by stipulation "on the evidence ad-
mitted and judicial admissions of fact heretofore made in this cause in this Court, on 
which judgment was entered on December 13, 1951.'' The district court found for the 
insured, holding the Texas statutes applicable on evidence that the insurer was doing 
business within Texas. This evidence not being in the record, the Fifth Circuit on appeal 
held that the case must be reversed for a new trial in which all the issues can be re-
opened, and new evidence introduced. Petition for rehearing has been denied. 
49 64 Stat. 773 (1950), 46 U.S.C. (1952) §§1281-1294 (war risk insurance); 41 Stat. 992 
(1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. (1952) §868; 52 Stat. 969 (1938), as amended, 46 U.S.C. 
(1952) §§1271-1279. 
50 Edward B. Hayes, Esq., of Chicago, Illinois, Petition for Rehearing, Supreme 
Court of the United States, October Term, 1954, No. 7, page 16. "But the effect of the 
majority opinion goes far beyond the mere loss of a judgment inflicted on a party. To 
lose a case is one thing. To lose the law is frightening.'' 
51 See, e.g., Pope &: Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953), and Garrett v. Moore-
McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942). 
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acy in maritime worker cases. It is possible the Supreme Court 
could assert federal supremacy for maritime workers but not for 
other maritime questions.52 But this would be a difficult dis-
tinction to defend. The same considerations that make seaworthi-
ness a matter of substantive maritime law would seem equally 
applicable to other distinctive admiralty subjects, including ma-
rine insurance. There are, of course, congressional statutes such as 
the Jones Act53 and the Lien Act.54 But there are subjects such as 
general average in which the admiralty law, as in marine insurance, 
is based on case-law, practice, and assumptions as to its exclusively 
maritime character. In seaworthiness and maintenance and cure, 
the Court might feel that the rules had been judicially established. 
Nonetheless, the criterion employed in Wilburn would be difficult 
to apply, and the distinction difficult to justify. 
The Court's opinion was conspicuous for its omission of any 
discussion of the need for uniformity in the admiralty that 
has been constantly stressed in the ]ensen55 and successor cases.56 
In fact, the Court assumed explicitly that in the absence of an 
Act of Congress or of controlling federal decisions, state law must 
be applicable. The insurance company contention that state inter-
ference with required uniformity was unconstitutional was given 
short shrift in a footnote.57 Yet such a contention was soundly 
based on doctrine upheld in the previous decisions defining the 
area of exclusive admiralty competence. 
The thrust of the Court's opinion was clearly directed at 
the insurance regulation problem. Dissatisfaction with the harsh-
ness of the "literal performance" rule was evident. The emphasis 
was on the power of the states to change, through corrective legis-
lation, insurance policy provisions believed to be unfair because 
of inequality in bargaining power. The literal performance rule 
may be an anachronism in modern American contract law. It 
has been vigorously criticized.58 All this enables one to understand 
the result. 
But it does not answer the question as to why the Court chose 
52 See GILMORE AND BLACK 63. 
53 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. (1952) §688. 
54 41 Stat. 1005 (1920), 46 U.S.C. (1952) §§971-975. 
55Southern Pacific"Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
56 See, e.g., cases cited note 51 supra. 
57 348 U.S. 310 at 321, footnote 29. 
58 See, e.g., Patterson, "Warranties in Insurance Law," 34 CoL. L. REv. 595 (19!14), 
and PATTERSON, EsSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW, 2d ed., (1957) passim. 
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not to_ fashion a new rule of its own that would have abolished 
or ameliorated the "literal performance" rule. One reason may 
have been that the existing case law sustained the literal perform-
ance rule. It would be more difficult to formulate a completely 
different rule in the face of these precedents than to choose among 
previously competing views. Nonetheless, the Court in the past 
has not hesitated to fashion new rules in the admiralty.59 
It would have been as possible for the Court to formulate 
a rule for this situation as it has proved to be in comparable ad-
miralty cases.00 The dissenting opinion revealed a willingness 
to reconsider what it considered to be the settled rule of literal 
performance.61 Rules of public policy in contracts do not pre-
sent unfamiliar judicial problems to the same extent as issues 
that involve complex administrative regulation. A comprehensive 
code was not required. If the causation rule of the Texas statute62 
had been adopted, the question of causation could have been 
familiarly dealt with by a jury under appropriate instructions. 
If a requirement that the breach must materially increase the risk 
of the New York type63 had been adopted, this, too, could be 
similarly administered. Furthermore, a judicial solution of the 
type envisaged might prove to be more effective in achieving the 
desired result than reliance on the state law and regulation that 
would be applicable under the actual decision.64 Moreover, such 
a judicial solution would be more certain than the various state 
laws and regulations. If Congress found the solution unsatisfac-
tory, it could correct it in the light of experience. No code for 
the whole field would be necessary, and congressional action on 
this specific narrower issue would be easier to obtain. 
The superior ability of the legislative process for the con-
sideration of all viewpoints, while theoretically true, is equally 
relevant in the many areas in which .the Court has fashioned a 
l'iO In the Halcyon case, note 46 supra, they refused to fashion a rule but said that 
to some ex.tent admiralty courts have felt "freer than common law courts in fashioning 
rules," and, in the Hawn case, note 4 supra, where they did fashion a rule, they re-
ferred to their "traditional discretion" in developing rules. In Wilburn itself, the Court 
said it had "fashioned a large part of the existing rules that govern admiralty.'' 
60 Bisso v. Inland Watenvays Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955), decided after Wilburn, is 
a good example. See discussion of Bisso case subsequently in text at note 135. 
61 348 U.S. 310 at 326. 
62 Quoted in note 27 supra. 
63 27 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §150. 
64 See discussion of state enactments, in text infra, at note 90. 
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controlling admiralty rule.65 The historic fact is that Congress 
has seldom intervened and that the Court has played the major 
role in the development of admiralty law. Consequently, the 
Court's reliance on legislation as the superior federal solution 
is not a convincing basis for its decision. 
The Court's most recent previous refusal to "fashion" a rule 
should not have encouraged such a solution. In Halcyon v. 
Haenn,66 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, had suggested 
a congressional solution for the determination of the ultimate 
responsibility for unseaworthiness between shipowners and steve-
doring companies, who had both contributed to the condition.67 
Congress did not act, but the lower federal courts, 68 dissatisfied 
with the result, developed new theories which were eventually 
adopted by the Supreme Court itself.69 Thus, in effect, in a 
relatively short period, the solution adopted by refusing to fashion 
a rule was rejected by the Court, speaking through a different 
majority. 
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence70 suggested a solution of 
the controversy by the application of the familiar maritime but 
local doctrine. The dissent felt this doctrine was not appropriate 
for marine insurance.71 The Court's opinion referred to the doc-
trine72 but did not discuss the possibility of applying it in the 
instant case.73 The doctrine, although a necessary tool for the ad-
65 Congress could, for example, weigh the competing considerations involved in 
fashioning the right of recovery of injured maritime workers. 
66 342 U.S. 282 (1952). 
67 The refusal was phrased in terms of not fashioning new judicial rules of con-
tribution as between joint tortfeasors. 
68 Notably the Second and Third Circuits. See discussion in GILMORE AND BLACK, c. 
VI, §§6-57. 
69 Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956); 
Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958). 
70 348 U.S. 310 at 321. 
71 Id. at 334-335. 
72 Id. at 313. 
73 It should be noted that petitioner's brief was in substance an argument based on 
the maritime but local doctrine and did not urge the broad doctrine adopted by the 
Court. Petitioner's brief had also suggested a distinction between those terms of a .marine 
insurance policy which were asserted to be peculiarly maritime, such as a perils of the 
sea clause, and terms asserted to be not peculiarly maritime, such as the anti-lien and 
pleasure use warranties. Fortunately, none of the opinions adopted this distinction, 
which would have encouraged litigation and would have resulted in different terms in 
the same policy .being governed by different sources of law. This would not have been 
a satisfactory solution for either insured or insurers. Compare the similar task created 
by the decision in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assn. v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 
29 (1956). 
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justment of national and local interests in admiralty, would be 
difficult to apply to marine insurance policies and would seem 
to have limited utility for the national and international opera-
tion of marine insurance. 74 
The controversy was remanded with instructions to apply the 
"appropriate" state law.75 v\lhile the decision has been generally 
criticized by the commentators, 76 this aspect of the decision has 
not received much emphasis. Yet, in assessing the consequences 
of a decision apparently denying the need for uniformity in 
admiralty, at least in marine insurance, the probabilities of chaos 
introduced by the application of state choice-of-law rules can 
not be minimized. The existing confusion in state choice-of-law 
rules with respect to contracts is well known. There would be 
more than the usual difficulty in identifying the "place of mak-
ing."77 The place of performance would frequently be unpre-
dictable.78 The "center" of the transaction might be equally diffi-
cult to ascertain.79 The intention of the parties, if not embodied 
in an express choice-of-law provision, offers no more certainty. 
One commentator assumed that, for ocean commerce, the law 
of the state of the home port would apply.80 Such a choice might 
be embodied in an express provision. The provision might be 
valid, 81 but, if it were in conflict with a state regulatory statute 
deemed applicable, its validity would be doubtful on the basis 
of current Supreme Court decisions.82 
Justice Reed's dissent suggests three possible choices of law: 
"that of the State where the insurance contract was issued, the 
State of the accident, or the State of the forum?82a The first of 
74 Because marine insurance typically involves coverage on a national or inter-
national basis, statutes geared to local conditions are not as useful or appropriate as 
in the case of pilotage statutes, for example. On the other hand, the atypical fact 
situation in the instant case might justify a special application of the doctrine, as Justice 
Frankfurter suggested. 
75 Note 32 supra. Cf. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., (2d Cir. 1955) 221 F. 
(2d) 189; Jansson v. Swedish American Line, (1st Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 212. 
76 GILMORE AND BLACK 44-45, 61-63; 35 BOST. UNIV. L. REV. 435 (1955); 43 ILL. B. J. 
741 (1955); 54 MICH. L. REv. 277 (1955); 1 N.Y.L.F. 360 (1955); 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 813 
(1955); 40 MINN. L. REv. 168 (1956); 29 So. CAL. L. REv. 359 (1956); Yancey, "State Regula-
tion of Marine Insurance," 23 INS. COUNSEL J. 143 (1956). 
77 Cf. Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 158 Misc. 466, 286 N.Y.S. 4 (1936). 
78 See Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., (2d Cir. 1955) 221 F. (2d) 189. 
79 Cf. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E. (2d) 99 (1954). 
80 54 MICH. L. REv. 277 (1955). 
81 See Siegelman case, note 78 supra. 
82 See, especially, Watson v. ·Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). 
82a 348 U.S. 310 at 334. 
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these may or may not be the place where the contract was made in 
view of the "localizing" statutes in many states, including Texas.83 
Some commentators84 have assumed that Wilburn decided that 
the law of the place of making applied and that Texas was the 
place where the contract was made. This is clearly wrong. The 
Court stated explicitly that the "applicable" law was to be de-
termined on the new trial.85 The equally fortuitous possibilities 
inherent in the use of the place of the accident would lead to the 
same confusion that the contract rule would involve. The law 
of the forum has little to be said for it in theory but might be 
applicable by virtue of the "localizing" statutes.86 None of these 
possibilities offer much prospect of certainty of application in the 
commercial field of marine insurance. 
Although the Court's opinion emphasizes the power of the 
states to legislate on marine insurance policy terms, it is hard to 
believe that state decisions embodying state policy would not be 
equally applicable.87 If not, a distinction between statutes and 
case-law would fly in the face of the concurrent development of 
the Erie88 doctrine. The subjection of marine insurance policies 
dealing with interstate and international maritime risks to the 
episodic course of state decisions in conflicts cases would be the 
very negation of the "national" law supposedly immune89 to the 
Erie thesis. But it seems implicit in the Court's opinion that this 
is the course to be followed. Such a consequence can hardly be 
conducive to the orderly development of a body of law for an 
essentially interstate and international business. It may be doubted 
that the decisions in the state cases were designed for application 
to marine insurance problems or that the need of uniformity in 
maritime matters was considered. In the instant case, the question 
sa Note 25 supra. 
84 GILMORE AND BLACK, at p. 62, say the case "was remanded with directions to give 
effect to the Texas statutes." Clark, C.J., in A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Com-
mercial Stevedoring Co., (2d Cir. 1958) 256 F. (2d) 227 at 229-230, where it is assumed 
that the contract was "made" in Texas and that Texas law was applicable. PATTERSON, 
EssENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW at p. 58 refers to Wilburn as creating "some confusion" 
by holding applicable "the law of the state where the boat was located and the contract 
was made." 
85 See quotation in note 32 supra. 
so See, e.g., the Texas statute, note 25 supra. 
87 See GILMORE AND BLACK 63. 
88 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
89 Stevens, "Erie R. R. v. Tompkins and the Uniform General Maritime Law," 
64 HARV. L. REv. 246 (1950), and cases cited in note 51 supra. See, also, Levinson v. 
Deupree, 335 U.S. 648 (1953). 
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interesting the Court was the possible application of the Texas 
statutes. Only subsequent development will reveal whether state 
case-law will also prevail over the competing need for uniformity 
in the maritime law. 
Even on the assumption that the Court's opinion was directed 
to the possible applicability of the Texas statutes or similar stat-
utes of other states in future cases, the decision will not neces-
sarily achieve this result to any substantial degree. Justice Black 
made footnote reference90 to the insurance statutes of New York, 
Louisiana, and Texas as examples of the comprehensive regula-
tion of insurance that the states had found necessary. Yet both 
Louisiana91 and New York92 specifically except marine insurance 
from the pertinent provisions. Only the Texas statutes93 are 
possibly applicable to this problem. Moreover, Professor Patter-
son, a leading authority in insurance law, has characterized the 
state statutory developments changing the strict performance 
rule as "piecemeal, opportunist, and obscurely worded."94 
Only seven states, including Texas, had .adopted the "con-
tributing-to-loss" type of statute.95 The statutes of Rhode Island,96 
Missouri,97 and Kansas98 apply only to life insurance. The appli-
cability of the remaining enactments to marine insurance is far 
from clear. Nebraska's statute99 is the most comprehensive. 
Texas100 and New Hampshire101 apply only to fire insurance. 
Iowa's statute102 is applicable to insurance on real and personal 
property. Of the seven states, only two, Texas and Rhode Island, 
can be considered as maritime states.103 Moreover, the other types 
90 348 U.S. 310 at 319, footnote 25. 
91 La. Rev. Stat. (1950) §22.619. 
92 27 N .Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §150(3). 
93 Notes 25, 26, and 27 supra. Counsel for the insurer in the Wilburn case has argued 
throughout the controversy that the Texas statutes were inapplicable, and that, if the 
general admiralty law did not govern, then Illinois law should govern as the place where 
the contract was "made." The IIJinois statutory provision on warranties is expressly 
inapplicable to marine insurance. III. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 73, §766. 
94 PATTERSON, EssENTIALS ·oF INSURANCE LAw, 2d ed., 375 (1957). 
95 Id. at 359. 
96 R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 153, §12. 
97 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §§376.580, 377.340. 
98 Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1949) §40-418. 
99 Neb. Rev. Stat. (Reissue, 1952) §44-358. 
100 Note 27 supra. 
101 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1955), c. 407, §4. 
102 Iowa Code (1949) §§515.101, 515.106. 
103 Yancey ["State Regulation of Marine Insurance," 23 INS. COUNSEL J. 143 at 147 
et seq. (1956)] has made a survey of the statutes of eleven leading maritime states, and 
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of state legislative reforms are also generally inapplicable to marine 
insurance. For example, the "increase-the-risk" statutes of Il-
linois104 and New' York105 specifically except marine insurance. 
The statutes changing warranties into representations are largely 
confined to life, health, and accident policies.106 Professor Patter-
son concludes his discussion of the strict performance rule by 
stating: "Neither legislation nor judicial decision has seriously 
affected the technical doctrine of warranties as applied to marine 
insurance."107 He has also ·written, in a note on state supervision 
and regulation of insurance, that: "Marine insurance, still an 
esoteric branch of the business, has largely escaped state 
regulation."108 
The significance of Professor Patterson's conclusions is en-
hanced by his clear disapproval of the strict performance rule in 
all types of insurance other than marine. In his opinion, the 
strict performance of marine insurance warranties involves dif-
ferent considerations109 and raises different problems in the ad-
ministration of justice.11° He approves of the "contributing-to-loss" 
type of statute, which he characterizes as the "most radical" re-
form111 only if the burden of proof is placed on the insured,112 
as in Iowa,118 so far as physical hazards are concerned, and concedes 
that the juridical risk placed on the insurer is a substantial argu-
ment against this type of statute.114 fie does approve of the "in-
found that only Massachusetts and Texas expressly require that breach of a warranty 
must be causally related to the loss, although the applicability to marine insurance is 
not explicit in either statute. Three of the states exclude marine insurance from their 
similar warranty statutes. Two of them in effect have statutes embodying the literal 
performance rule. Three states have no statute dealing with the problem in general, and 
one which does omits any provisions concerning warranties. 
104 Note 93 supra. 
105 Note 92 supra. 
106PATIERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW, 2d ed., 350 (1957). 
107 Id. at 308. Professor Patterson goes on to say that the applicability of the strict 
performance rule to the "popular forms of insurance, life, fire, accident, and liability, 
[it] has led to revolt." 
108 PATTERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE, 3d ed., 44 (1955). 
109 PATTERSON, EssENTJALS OF INSURANCE LAW, 2d ed., 274 et seq. (1957). 
110 Id. at 308. 
111 Id. at 353. 
112 Id. at 353-361. 
113 Note 102 supra. The German law of 1908 is similar on burden of proof. Under 
the other American statutes, there is no such provision and courts put the burden of 
proof on the insurer. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAw, 2d ed., 357 (1957). 
114 Id. at 357-358. He points out that there have been no new statutes of this type 
in twenty years (as of 1957). 
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crease-of-risk" type of statute if carefully drafted.1115 As he points 
out, New York and Illinois except marine insurance from these 
statutes.116 Thus it can be seen that the possible application of 
state statutes is of doubtful efficacy. 
Although, as previously noted, 117 the scope of the holding 
presents an important issue, only one118 subsequent controversy 
has raised specifically the question of the effect of the Wilburn 
ruling on other admiralty rules.118a In Amador v. AJS ]. Ludwig 
Mowinckels Rederi,119 the court held the shipowner liable to a 
longshoreman for violating the duty of seaworthiness because of 
failure to correct conditionally improper stowage. Consequently, 
it became necessary to determine whether the shipowner could 
recover over, either by implication or under the contract between 
them, against the stevedoring company, which had been found 
negligent in discharging the cargo. The contract provision on 
indemnity was identical in language with that involved in Amer-
ican Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello,120 in which the Supreme Court 
reversed a finding that the stevedore was liable and remanded for 
evidence on the intention of the parties. The court of appeals 
remarked that it was clear that the Supreme Court in that case 
intended that the meaning on remand was to be determined under 
the admiralty law. The court of appeals referred to Wilburn and 
raised the question of whether the indemnity contract in the case 
at bar should now be determined under the law "of the state where 
it was made,"121 and not in accordance with admiralty law. "If 
there is no difference in this regard between an indemnity contract 
like this and a contract of marine insurance, the state law ap-
1115 Id. at 373. 
116 Id. at 372. 
117 See text at note 49 supra. 
118 In Saskatchewan Government Insurance Office v. Ciaramitaro, (1st Cir. 1956) 
234 F. (2d) 491, a finding of the court below that no breach of a marine insurance 
warranty had occurred was affirmed without reliance on the Massachusetts warranty 
statute "apparently applicable here," citing Wilburn. 
118a In Booth Steamship Co. v. Meier and Oelhaf Co., (2d Cir., Dec. 29, 1958), 
unreported at this writing, Wilburn was held inapplicable to implied warranties in 
maritime service contracts, relying on the Mowinckels case, note 126 infra. 
119 (2d Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 437, cert. den. 350 U.S. 901 (1955). Learned Hand, C. J., 
wrote the opinion. The other members of the court were Judges Swan and Frank. 
120 330 U.S. 446 (1947). There is a slight variation in wording in the two indemnity 
clauses but the Second Circuit described them as "identical." Note 119 supra, at 441. 
It might, of course, be argued that the Porello decision was itself conclusive on the 
establishment of a federal admiralty rule, and therefore that Wilburn was inapplicable. 
121224 F. (2d) 437 at 441. See text supra at note 84. 
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plies. "122 The choice between federal and state law was to 
be made on the new trial. 
On the remand, Judge Edelstein held that state law would 
apply.123 Even though the stevedoring contract itself is a maritime 
contract and the right of injured workers to recover for maritime 
torts is "rooted in federal maritime law,"124 the shipowner does 
not acquire rights rooted in admiralty law in its contracts with 
the stevedore. Although the indemnity clause is related to mari-
time tort problems, there is not as much apparent need for uni-
formity in the interpretation of indemnity clauses as there is in 
contracts for marine insurance. Inasmuch as the whole transaction 
was centered in New York, the place of contracting, that law should 
apply, and under that law there could be no recovery over. Since 
the reviewing court might disagree, Judge Edelstein considered 
what ruling would result if admiralty law applied, and found 
there could be recovery over on the basis of the previous holdings 
in the Porello125 litigation. 
On appeal, the Second Circuit, an entirely different panel 
sitting, reversed,126 holding that admiralty law governed, and that 
under the previous decisions in Porello121 the stevedore was liable 
by virtue of the indemnity clause in the contract. The issue as to 
implied indemnity121a was, therefore, not reached The court con-
cluded that the Wilburn case was intended to apply only to the 
"limited area" of marine insurance. In support of this conclusion, 
the court cited the ]ensen128 line of cases, Pope &Talbot v. Hawn129 
on the federal nature of the rights of maritime workers, and the 
recent implied indemnity cases130 in which the Supreme Court had 
not mentioned the possible relevance of state law under Wilburn. 
Noting the emphasis the Court in the Wilburn case had given to 
122Ibid. 
123Amador v. The Ronda, (S.D. N.Y. 1956) 146 F. Supp. 617. 
124 Id. at 622. 
125 Note 120 supra; the earlier decision in Porello v. United States, (2d Cir. 1946) 
153 F. (2d) 605; and the decision on remand from the Supreme Court, Porello v. United 
States, (S.D. N.Y. 1950) 94 F. Supp. 952. 
126 A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels R. v. Commercial Stevedoring Co., 256 F. (2d) 227 
(1958). Clark, C.J., wrote the opinion and the other members of the panel were Lumbard, 
J., and Dimock, J. Petition for certiorari was filed, 27 U.S. I.Aw WEEK 3096 (Aug. 27, 
1958) (No. 312), but the case has been settled. 
127 Note 125 supra. 
127a See subsequent decision on implied indemnity, note 118a supra. 
12s Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
120 346 U.S. 406 (1953). 
130 Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956); 
Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958). 
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the history of state regulation of insurance, the Court believed 
there was no intention in Wilburn to rule on the validity of state 
regulation of other types of maritime contracts. In support of this 
belief, the subsequent Bisso case131 was cited where the validity 
of a contractual provision excusing a towboat owner from liability 
for negligence was decided without reference to state law. There-
fore, Porello132 is still good law, and the indemnity provision, 
construed in accordance with the admiralty law, permits recovery 
over against the stevedore. 
This decision133 of the Second Circuit, a court of great prestige 
and experience in admiralty matters, should have an important 
influence in determining the extent of the Wilburn holding. By 
stressing the Wilburn emphasis on state regulation of insurance, 
and confining the holding to the "limited area" of marine insur-
ance, it should avoid sterile inquiries into the logical and theoreti-
cal implications of Wilburn as to the need for uniformity in 
admiralty. 
The most persuasive aspect of the decision is its reliance on 
the subsequent opinions of the Supreme Court itself in cases 
where the Wilburn rationale might have been theoretically ap-
plicable. Thus, in the cases relating to implied indemnity,134 there 
had been no discussion of state law. It would be impractical as 
well as illogical to tum to state law when the indemnity was 
express. 
The Bisso135 case is even stronger support for treating Wilburn 
as not intended to go beyond state regulation of insurance. The 
issue in that case was the validity of a contractual provision ex-
empting a towboat owner from liability for its own negligence. 
No mention was made of state law. The Court stated explicitly 
that, in the absence of a controlling statute, the question "must 
be decided as a part of the judicially created admiralty law."186 
In Bisso, unlike Wilburn, there were conflicting decisions in the 
Circuits. It was, therefore, easier to "fashion" a rule in resolving 
this conflict than it would have been in Wilburn where all the 
previous federal decisions were in accord. Nonetheless, the basic 
131 Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955). 
132 330 U.S. 446 (1947). 
183 Note 126 supra. 
184 Notes 130 and 69 supra. 
135 349 U.S. 85 (1955). 
136Ibid. 
574 MICHIGAN LAW R.Evmw [,Vol. 57 
policy question in the two cases is essentially the same. In both, 
the decisions struck down provisions that were thought to reflect 
inequality of bargaining power. In Wilburn, this was accom-
plished by holding state law controlling. In Bisso, the same result 
was achieved by "fashioning"135a a controlling admiralty rule. It is, 
therefore, submitted that Bisso is of crucial importance in predict-
ing the extent of the Wilburn holding. 
In summarizing the impact of the Wilburn decision after 
nearly four years, what should our admiralty lawyer predict on 
January 1, 1959? Has the substantive admiralty law been "lost"?187 
Has it had the possible consequences "foreseen by some learned 
commentators?138 
So far as the scope of the decision is concerned, the Supreme 
Court itself, particularly in the Bisso139 case, has indicated it will 
not be extended on a theoretical basis. This is confirmed by the 
Second Circuit decision on the second appeal in the Mowinckels 
case,140 answering Judge Hand's query on the first appeal,141 which 
raised, to some extent, implications more disturbing than Wilburn 
itself. 
The practical consequences of the decision appear to have 
been quite limited. Only one141a litigated controversy has presented 
the question squarely. The admiralty practitioners142 do not seem 
to have been as disturbed by the decision as the law writers148 have 
been. There has been little comment in industry journals or re-
lated professional publications.144 What is the explanation of this 
disparity in emphasis? 
In the first place, state laws, including regulatory statutes,145 
have not proved, on examination, to be sufficiently different from 
the general admiralty law to cause as much change as might have 
136a Rather than "fashioning" a rule, the Court could be said to have "recognized" 
an existing admiralty rule. 
137 See quotation in note 50 supra. 
138 GILMORE AND BLACK 44.45 and 61-63. 
139 349 U.S. 85 (1955). 
140 Note 126 supra. 
141 Note 119 supra. 
141a There are now t1vo. See note 118a supra. 
142 This statement and much of what follows is· based on interviews with some of 
the leading admiralty lawyers in Chicago and New York. Their generosity and courtesy 
were much appreciated by the writer. 
143 Note 76 supra, and, it must be confessed, this writer, or otherwise this article 
would have not been undertaken. 
144 Yancey, note 76 supra, is the principal such contribution found. 
145 See discussion in text supra, at note 90. 
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been suspected. State and federal courts should be able to decide 
marine insurance questions much as before unless an issue similar 
to Wilburn was involved and relevant state legislation or case-law 
pointed to a result differing from the previous admiralty rule. The 
same approach to the governing rule could be taken in negotiated 
settlements, and marine underwriters are not inclined to litigate 
doubtful cases. It is significant that the Maritime Law Associa-
tion's Committee appointed to consider the Cushing and Wilburn 
decisions has not had occasion to report any serious results flowing 
from these decisions.146 Moreover, no congressional action has 
been proposed with respect to the Wilburn decision. 
The factual operation of the marine insurance business may 
provide a further explanation. The policy in the Wilburn case 
was not sought by established shipowners nor obtained directly 
through a specialized marine broker or underwriter. Substantial 
shipowners have experienced staffs which try to check the state of 
compliance with warranties. If a rider is necessary to cover a known 
additional risk that would breach an existing warranty, then these 
specialists can and do obtain it. Marine underwriters and marine 
insurance brokers also try to keep a watchful eye on their pol-
icies, and would not normally permit a Wilburn situation to 
arise. Such a controversy is most likely to develop out of the un-
usual combination of a small boat owner and the utilization of a 
broker not familiar with marine insurance. 
Despite these preventive measures, however, a Wilburn situa-
tion could occasionally develop and present the difficulties engen-
dered by that decision. The central difficulty is the transitory loca-
tion of the ship as a moving object. Consequently, it is nof prac-
ticable to police effectively the performance of policy conditions, 
even by the staffs of large shipuwners. Furthermore, no changes 
in policy terms can be devised that will be effective in every juris-
diction where the vessel goes under the policy, and where the 
insurer may be subject to suit. Different characterizations and 
different statutory and judicial choice of law rules would lead to 
different results. Thus, in Wilburn itself, the warranties would 
have had a different effect in Illinois146• than in Texas.146b These 
146 The Maritime Law Association of the United States, Document No. 398, pages 
4033-4040 (1956): No. 407, page 4132 (1957); No. 420, page 4312 (1958). 
146a Note 93 supra. 
146b Notes 25, 26, and 27 supra. 
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are cogent reasons why it would have been better to have decided 
Wilburn under the general admiralty law. 
Wilburn may, nonetheless, be a maritime but local decision in 
its practical consequences, although it was not decided on this 
doctrinal basis, as Justice Frankfurter had suggested.147 The net 
impact of the decision has been in the direction Justice Frank-
furter had hoped for. Not only will the decision probably be con-
fined to the "limited area"148 of marine insurance theoretically, 
but practically it is not apt to have the consequences that were 
feared. Thus, an unnecessarily broad decision that threatened the 
uniformity concept in admiralty may be chiefly significant as a 
salutary reminder149 of the Supreme Court's disapproval of con-
tract clauses thought to have been dictated by superior bargain-
ing power. 
Finally, by placing the decision on broad grounds of federal-
state power, the Court made the task of bench and bar more diffi-
cult. Moreover, choosing to settle the controversy on a basis not 
urged by petitioner's counsel, the Court may not have had the 
benefit of full argument as to the practical consequences of its 
decision. Since congressional action was unlikely, the Court's ap-
parent policy objectives might have been more effectively achieved 
by "fashioning" a new rule150 than by leaving the question with 
the states. 
147 348 U.S. 310 at 321·324. 
148 Note 126 supra. 
149 In this context, Wilburn is a successor to the decision in United States v. 
Atlantic Mutual, 343 U.S. 236 (1952), invalidating the "Both-to-Blame" clause. 
150 See discussion in text supra, at note 60. 
